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Abstract
The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate
Kuhn’s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific
theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn’s
points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show
that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome
communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational de-
liberation regarding the question whether a theory is worthy of further
pursuit. These tools are persuasion, translation and interpretation. How-
ever, we argue that the perspective of epistemic semantic monism present
in Kuhn’s work obstructs the full applicability of these tools. We show
that dropping this perspective makes the notions of persuasion and inter-
pretation more fruitful, and moreover, allows for a pluralism of scientific
theories and practices that complements the pluralism based on disagree-
ment among scientists, emphasized by Kuhn.
Keywords: Thomas Kuhn, pursuit worthiness, theory choice, epistemic
monism, methodological pluralism.
1 Introduction
The context of pursuit refers to a period in which scientists pursue a new
idea/scientific object/hypothesis/theory/etc. and preliminarily evaluate its pur-
suit worthiness. For example, Larry Laudan defines it as a context specific for
the emergence of a new research tradition, in which scientists begin to pursue,
explore and develop a theory long before it is qualified to be accepted over its
older rivals (Laudan, 1977, p. 110). As such, the context of pursuit combines
the aspects of both discovery and justification, which have often been discussed
in view of Hans Reichenbach’s distinction between the context of discovery and
the context of justification (Reichenbach (1938)). On the one hand, the context
of pursuit regards the process of theory development, while on the other hand,
the normative question whether a given scientific idea is worthy of pursuit is
posed in it.
However, the question of pursuit worthiness can be posed not only with re-
gard to emerging scientific theories, but also with regard to accepted theories.
In the latter case we are interested in their further heuristic capacity (see Nickles
(2006)). Moreover, we may ask whether certain aspects of an overthrown scien-
tific theory are still worthy of pursuit, such as its constituent epistemic objects
(see Chang (2011)).
1
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to critically investigate Kuhn’s stance
on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and second,
to show the actuality of some of Kuhn’s points on this issue, in view of their
critical analysis.
The significance of our research questions goes both ways as well. First,
Kuhn’s work is important for the topic of pursuit worthiness since it emphasizes
and explicates tensions in communication and understanding that can appear
among scientists working in different scientific paradigms. This issue is of direct
relevance for the question of how a scientist working in one paradigm can assess
the pursuit worthiness of a theory belonging to a different paradigm and hence
for the question whether or to what extent scientists can engage in a rational
deliberation process concerning this topic. There are serious threats for various
prerequisites of the process of rational deliberation that can arise due to these
tensions between paradigms. For instance, in order not to talk at cross-purposes
participants in such debates should have a shared set of standards to which they
can refer to and which can help them to evaluate and communicate pros and
cons of the given candidates. Moreover, scientists should have cognitive access
to the given candidates so that they are able to understand them.
Second, focusing on the topic of pursuit worthiness can highlight certain
aspects of Kuhn’s views on the rationality underlying theory change before
and after scientific revolutions, which have so far been insufficiently clarified in
the literature on his work. Evidently, before a scientific revolution arises an
alternative paradigm must have gone through the context of pursuit in which it
was developed and positively evaluated as being worthy of pursuit.1 Similarly,
after a scientific revolution takes place the question arises whether (certain parts
of) the old paradigm are still worthy of pursuit.
Hence, in this paper we will present the following. First, we will show in
which way Kuhn explicates the assessment of pursuit worthiness of scientific
theories, and at which point in the development of a theory scientists engage
in a discussion over its pursuit worthiness (Section 2). We will then show that
Kuhn’s notions of persuasion (Section 3), translation and interpretation (Section
4) are fruitful tools for the rationality underlying the reasoning of a scientist
who is to evaluate a paradigm incommensurable with the one in which she is
currently working. Nevertheless, we will show that Kuhn’s tools are burdened
by a type of epistemic semantic monism, also pointed by other authors who
discussed his work (Section 5). We will argue that in order for Kuhn’s tools to be
suitable for facilitating the understanding and communication among scientists
regarding the topic of pursuit worthiness, the epistemic semantic monism has
to be dropped.
1It is important to notice that the relationship between paradigms and theories is am-
biguous in Kuhn’s work already due to the ambiguous nature of the former notion. For a
detailed discussion on this ambiguity we refer the reader to (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, Chapter
4.). For the purposes of this paper it will suffice to use these two terms loosely, allowing for
the assessment of pursuit worthiness to be applicable to both terms (paradigms and theories).
Where a given paradigm is a unit of appraisal that encompasses one or more theories, the
assessment of its pursuit worthiness is also essentially informed by the pursuit worthiness of
these respective theories.
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2 Kuhn on the Evaluation of Pursuit Worthi-
ness
The main obstacle in understanding Kuhn’s points on the evaluation of pursuit
worthiness comes from the fact that they fall under his general discussion of
theory choice. Hence, we will first take a look at a few places that indicate that
Kuhn considered this type of assessment to be different from the one regarding
theory acceptance.
The prospective character Let us begin with a couple of places from The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions :
. . . if a new candidate for paradigm had to be judged from the
start by hard-headed people who examined only relative problem-
solving ability, the sciences would experience very few major revolu-
tions . . . But paradigm debates are not really about relative problem-
solving ability, though for good reasons they are usually couched in
those terms. Instead, the issue is which paradigm should in the future
guide research on problems many of which neither competitor can
yet claim to resolve completely. A decision between alternate ways
of practicing science is called for, and in the circumstances that deci-
sion must be based less on past achievement than on future promise.
The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must often
do so in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving. He
must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the
many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the older
paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of that kind can only be
made on faith. (Kuhn, 1962 [1996], p. 157-158, italics added.)
The parts in italics indicate that Kuhn here obviously speaks of the pursuit
worthiness of paradigms. Such an assessment of a new candidate concerns its
future promise, which is based on faith that it will succeed in solving some
important current problems. In other words, what is at stake here is not the
current epistemic performance of a paradigm, but rather its epistemic fertility
for future development. The type of appraisal we are interested in is not a ret-
rospective but a prospective one (see Whitt (1990, 1992), Nickles (2006, 2009),
Sˇesˇelja & Straßer (201x)).2
2Different authors (e.g. those just mentioned) have emphasized different values as indices
of pursuit worthiness, but explanatory and heuristic virtues of the given theory have often
been considered as some of the crucial ones. For instance, the capability of the theory to offer
explanations that its rivals have not managed to offer so far can be seen as such an indicator.
This explanatory virtue is different from the one usually required for theory acceptance, where
we are not only interested in what the theory can explain, but also in what it cannot explain,
that is, in its explanatory anomalies. In contrast, when we evaluate whether a theory is worthy
of pursuit, instead of focusing on its explanatory anomalies, we are rather interested in its
programmatic character which indicates that the investigation can proceed in spite of the
current anomalies and towards their resolution. Hence, we are interested in the prospective
values, which allow for a prospective assessment, rather than a retrospective one, which is
typical for the context of acceptance.
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The two phases of pursuit Kuhn goes on to argue that a crisis is important
precisely in order to allow for a new candidate to be at all noticed. He then
adds:
But crisis alone is not enough. There must also be a basis, though
it need be neither rational nor ultimately correct, for faith in the par-
ticular candidate chosen. Something must make at least a few scien-
tists feel that the new proposal is on the right track, and sometimes
it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic considerations that can
do that. Men have been converted by them at times when most of
the articulable technical arguments pointed the other way.
This is not to suggest that new paradigms triumph ultimately
through some mystical aesthetic. On the contrary, very few men
desert a tradition for these reasons alone. Often those who do turn
out to have been misled. But if a paradigm is ever to triumph it
must gain some first supporters, men who will develop it to the point
where hardheaded arguments can be produced and multiplied. And
even those arguments, when they come, are not individually decisive.
Because scientists are reasonable men, one or another argument will
ultimately persuade many of them. But there is no single argument
that can or should persuade them all. (Kuhn, 1962 [1996], p. 158,
italics added.)
In these passages Kuhn indicates that there are two stages of the evaluation
of pursuit worthiness of a paradigm. On the one hand, the first supporters
of a paradigm feel that the new proposal is on the right track. Kuhn here
departs from rational reasons one might have for evaluating a new paradigm as
initially worthy of pursuit. He allows for “personal and inarticulate aesthetic
considerations”, which may turn out to have been misleading, to serve as the
basis of the evaluation. On the other hand, if the first supporters develop the
paradigm further, it may reach the point where arguments can finally be used.
This is the second stage of the evaluation of pursuit worthiness, which proceeds
in rational terms, and where the process of persuasion can begin.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1993) captures these two steps as the first two out
of three types of reasons that according to Kuhn underlie theory choice: i) the
reasons relevant to the very first adherents of a theory, ii) the reasons generated
while working on a new theory, which eventually bring more and more members
of the community to adopt that theory, and iii) the reasons which are decisive for
the choice of the entire community to accept the new theory (p. 239). The first
set of reasons refers to the work on the theory prior to its public presentation.
The second set refers to the stage at which the theory enters the public discourse.
Such a distinction between the two steps in the evaluation of pursuit wor-
thiness has been pointed out by others as well. For instance, Thomas Nickles
(Nickles, 1980, p. 9-10) distinguishes between generation and pursuit as the first
two phases of a scientific research.3 Generation concerns the production of an
idea which initially seems worthy of a second look in relation to the problem
at hand. It represents a minimal achievement that may be confined to an in-
dividual thinker, but which nevertheless can be formulated in view of certain
constraints. In contrast, pursuit is the phase in which a scientist is discovering
3The third and final phase is acceptance.
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an idea that is worthy of pursuit, i.e. worthy of some expenditure or time and
effort by the scientific community.
Two claims of pursuit worthiness Let us now distinguish between two
types of claims of pursuit worthiness. One claim of pursuit worthiness concerns
the situation in which a scientist is confronted with the question: “Should I pur-
sue this theory?”. This question regards the assessment of pursuit worthiness as
a research directive. This is obviously predominant in (though not restricted to)
the first phase discussed above. For both Kuhn (including Hoyningen-Huene’s
reading of him) and for Nickles, this first phase falls in the domain of reasons
underlying decisions concerning research activities of an individual scientist. For
instance, Kuhn speaks of “a decision between the alternate ways of practicing
science”, of “embracing a new paradigm”, and of its first supporters “developing
it” themselves (rather than merely evaluating it).
However, there is another type of claims of pursuit worthiness, that refer
to an assessment of pursuit worthiness as an evaluative stance. These claims
regard the question: “Would pursuing this theory be in the epistemic interest of
science/the respective scientific domain?”. Note that a claim of pursuit worthi-
ness as an evaluative stance bares no necessary practical commitments regarding
one’s own research. A scientist working in one paradigm may evaluate a theory
from another paradigm as worthy of pursuit without necessarily concluding that
she herself should engage in its pursuit. Indeed, more than one theory (each
of which may belong to a different paradigm) may be worthy of pursuit at the
same time.4
This latter type of pursuit worthiness claims are important as soon as a
theory enters a public discourse (and hence, in the second phase indicated by
Kuhn). This is the point when a scientist can evaluate not only her own research
path, but also those of other scientists, and engage in a rational discussion on
their pursuit worthiness. She may not only be interested in the question what
she is to pursue, but also, how cognitively resp. epistemically attractive other
rivaling inquiries are. Moreover, this is the point when she may receive critical
feedback from other scientists about her own research and its pursuit worthiness.
We will come back to Kuhn’s neglect of pursuit worthiness as an evaluative
stance in Section 3.
In summary, we have seen that Kuhn underlines the importance to prospec-
tively evaluate the pursuit worthiness of theories, that he establishes two phases
of scientific inquiry in which this question arises, and finally, that he recognizes
the pursuit worthiness concerning the research directive of a scientist. The ques-
tion remains how we are to evaluate whether the claims regarding the pursuit
worthiness of a given theory are cognitively and/or epistemically warranted.
How can a rational assessment be safeguarded from the biases rooted in one’s
4It is important to notice that the above distinction is not exhaustive when it comes to dif-
ferent claims of pursuit worthiness. For an elaborate discussion on this topic see (Sˇesˇelja et al.
(2012)). Moreover, since cognitive issues were of primary interest in Kuhn’s work, we speak
here only of cognitive pursuit worthiness. It is important to keep in mind though that the
assessment of pursuit worthiness may usually include a broader set of both cognitive and
non-cognitive values, in which case we can speak of practical pursuit worthiness. The latter
should not be confused with cognitive pursuit worthiness as a research directive, since practi-
cal pursuit worthiness also appears in the form of an evaluative stance and (a decision making
form of) a research directive.
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own research framework? How can different applications and understandings of
shared standards be bridged so that they don’t lead to a communication break-
down? To this end Kuhn introduced certain tools that may help in facilitating
the understanding among scientists working in different paradigms. We will
examine these tools in the following two sections.
3 Argumentation as Persuasion
Persuasion and theory choice In response to the criticism accusing him
of irrationality underlying theory choice, Kuhn argues in the Postscript to the
Structure that his stance does not entail that proponents of incommensurable
paradigms cannot communicate with each other, nor that in their debates there
can be no recourse to good reasons (Kuhn, 1962 [1996], p. 199). He rejects
accusations according to which such reasons are ultimately personal, subjec-
tive or irrational. He explains that his point was rather to show that debates
over theory choice cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles a logical or
mathematical proof (Ibid.).
More precisely, Kuhn rejects what we have elsewhere called the strong notion
of rationality5 governing theory choice. According to this notion, by applying
the criteria that are shared by the scientific community, one obtains a unique
choice of a scientific theory. In other words, this notion assumes that all scien-
tists will have the same preference order on theories on the basis of a shared
set of criteria with which they evaluate them. However, Kuhn argues that dis-
cussions among scientists instead of such an “algorithmic path” often take the
path of persuasion:
. . . the superiority of one theory to another is something that
cannot be proved in the debate. Instead, I have insisted, each party
must try, by persuasion, to convert the other. . . . Nothing about
that relatively familiar thesis implies either that there are no good
reasons for being persuaded or that those reasons are not ultimately
decisive for the group. Nor does it even imply that the reasons for
choice are different from those usually listed by philosophers of sci-
ence: accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like. What it should
suggest, however, is that such reasons function as values and that
they can thus be differently applied, individually and collectively, by
men who concur in honoring them. (p. 198-199)
Kuhnian persuasion would not be very useful for our discussion were it restricted
to the question of theory acceptance. As the following quotation shows, Kuhn
considered it also applicable for the assessment of pursuit worthiness:
Recognizing that criteria of choice can function as values . . . allows
the standard criteria to function fully in the earliest stages of theory
choice, the period when they are most needed but when, on the tra-
ditional view, they function badly or not at all. (Kuhn, 1977, p. 331,
italics added)
5See (Sˇesˇelja & Straßer, 2009, p. 323).
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Thus, persuasion as a form of argumentation based on cognitive criteria
that function as values, is applicable to the earliest stages of theory assessment.
We should not overlook though that Kuhn describes this assessment as theory
choice. Moreover:
These five characteristics – accuracy, consistency, scope, simplic-
ity, and fruitfulness – are all standard criteria for evaluating the
adequacy of a theory. . . . I agree entirely with the traditional view
that they play a vital role when scientists must choose between an
established theory and an upstart competitor. Together with oth-
ers of much the same sort, they provide the shared basis for theory
choice. (Kuhn, 1977, p. 322, italics added.)6
Hence, the key cognitive issue that confronts scientists when they are to
assess an upcoming theory is the choice of a research framework which they
will individually pursue. They are to choose between the established theory
and the newcomer theory. It wouldn’t make much sense if choice here meant
that scientists are to accept one of the two rivals as a fully developed paradigms,
simply due to the fact that the newcomer is not sufficiently developed to undergo
such an evaluation. Nor can Kuhn refer to scientists making a claim of pursuit
worthiness as an evaluative stance, for in that case, no choice would have to be
made: a scientist may evaluate both the dominant theory and its new rival as
worthy of pursuit in this sense. The most plausible interpretation seems to be
that a scientist is to choose a research directive, and thus to make a claim of
pursuit worthiness as a research directive.
In light of what we have just said, when Kuhn writes that:
To persuade someone is, I take it, to convince him that one’s own
view is superior and ought therefore supplant his own. (Kuhn,
1962 [1996], p. 203)
we can conclude that ‘supplanting of one view by another’ seems to refer to a
shift of a scientist from one paradigm to another. Faced by a choice between
two paradigms, a scientist is to make a decision which of them she is to work
in.
Persuasion regarding an evaluative stance of pursuit worthiness There
are various types of convictions and associated commitments of a scientist S with
respect to which this supplanting and convincing can take place:
C1. the conviction that a theory T is true/adequate or (epistemically or
cognitively) the best in a certain domain and hence superior to other
candidates;
C2. the conviction that a theory T is the best for S to investigate;
C3. the conviction that a theory T is worthy of pursuit (though it may not
necessarily be the best option for S to work in and it may not be the
best theory in the given domain).
The first question is usually raised in the context of acceptance: there we are
interested in the best theory (though, of course, being the best is not sufficient
for being accepted since it may only be the best of a poor bunch). The second
6See also (Kuhn, 2000, p. 96).
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question concerns pursuit worthiness as a research directive, while the third
question concerns pursuit worthiness as an evaluative stance. Note that (C1)
and (C2) are of a more exclusive character than (C3): one usually settles for
one theory (in some cases maybe two, but rarely more theories) to which the
commitment that is associated with (C1) resp. (C2) is directed. However, many
more theories than the one which is considered the best, resp. the one a scientist
is currently working in may be worthy of pursuit. Hence, the commitment that
comes with convictions of type (C3) are less exclusive and more pluralistic in
nature. As our analysis above suggests, Kuhn doesn’t distinguish between (C1)
and (C2), while he neglects (C3).
Moreover, unlike questions (C1) and (C2), the claim of pursuit worthiness
as an evaluative stance does not require a comparative assessment in the sense
that the overall pursuit worthiness of theories needs to be compared (see also
Whitt (1990)). Instead, the indices of theory promise (see e.g. Whitt (1992),
Sˇesˇelja & Straßer (201x)) are assessed in view of the cognitive horizon, which
is constituted by other rivaling theories. The cognitive horizon is constituted
–among other things– by the current subject domain of a given discipline, by
the problems that scientists tackle, by the anomalies and difficulties they face,
by respected scientific methods, etc. The cognitive horizon need not be homoge-
neous: various sub-disciplines may have different preferences e.g. on what counts
to be a good scientific method, a good explanation etc. Moreover, a newly pur-
sued theory may challenge this status quo in some ways. For instance, one of
the indices of pursuit worthiness can be formulated as the question whether the
theory is able to offer certain novel explanations or predictions, that is, to ex-
plain or predict phenomena that its rivals are not able to. Hence, we may have
to compare certain features of the new theory with those of its rivals, which con-
stitute the cognitive horizon. However, that does not mean we are comparing
the overall cognitive promise of these theories.
Indeed, scientists will not necessarily agree about which theories are worthy
of pursuit and which are not in this latter (evaluative) sense of the term. They
may still need to persuade one another about their respective stances. But this
type of persuasion does not require that they supplant their convictions in the
sense of (C1) and (C2). Persuasion suitable for this type of claims may begin
by convincing the opponent that the theory in question has certain cognitive
properties which are conducive of its pursuit worthiness. Hence, the opponent
(who originally evaluated this theory as not worthy of pursuit) might be con-
vinced that her view on the theory needs to be supplanted by the new insights.
In so far, we can still say with Kuhn that to persuade someone is to convince
her that one’s view (regarding the pursuit worthiness of the given theory) is
superior and ought thus to supplant her own. However, the opponent need not
supplant her views regarding the pursuit worthiness (or acceptance) of other
theories, including the one(s) she is currently pursuing.
Whether we speak of claims of pursuit worthiness as research directives
or as evaluative stances, a question that comes up in either case is: how are
scientists to proceed towards understanding each other regarding such claims if
their respective theories are incommensurable? How is the process of persuasion
at all possible in face of such differences in their worldviews? In particular, with
regard to the claims of pursuit worthiness as evaluative stances we can ask:
How is the rationality of the claims of pursuit worthiness safeguarded in face of
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incommensurable theories? How are scientists able to evaluate whether a claim
stating that a given theory is epistemically worthy of pursuit – is a cognitively
or epistemically warranted claim? To this end Kuhn introduces additional tools,
which we will explore in the following section.
4 Translation and Interpretation
Translation In order to explicate how the process of persuasion is at all possi-
ble among scientists working in different paradigms, Kuhn introduces “a potent
tool both for persuasion and for conversion”, namely translation:
However incomprehensible the new theory may be to the pro-
ponents of tradition, the exhibit of impressive concrete results will
persuade at least a few of them that they must discover how such
results are achieved. For that purpose they must learn to trans-
late. . . (Kuhn, 1977, p. 339, italics added)
With the term ‘translation’ one has to be careful as a scholar of Kuhn’s work
since in different contexts in Kuhn’s writings this terms has different meanings.
For instance ‘translation’ may refer to the skill of a translator, i.e., somebody
who already masters two languages and, given a text in one of them, is able to
“produce an equivalent text in the other language” (Kuhn, 2000, p. 38). Then
again, ‘equivalent text’ may mean different things. In his criticism of Kitcher
(Kuhn, 2000, pp. 33-57) it is conceived of as a substitution procedure that
enables one to replace concepts, names, predicates, etc. in one language with
correlates in another language so that extensional equivalence is achieved. Kuhn
argues that this is suboptimal to acquire a full understanding since it proceeds
irrespective of the intensional, associative, and epistemic deep structure of the
translated language. This criticism gives a more refined interpretation of ‘equiv-
alent text’, one that often amounts to an unreachable ideal, especially in the
context of incommensurable theories.
For the passage above we suggest that ‘learning to translate’ is to be under-
stood in terms of a didactic tool in the process of language acquisition. Hence,
in view of certain research results scientists can, according to Kuhn, find a new
theory worthy of further understanding and learning about. To this end, they
can learn to translate terms from this theory to the one they are already ex-
perienced in. Note that translation here does not presuppose that one already
speaks both languages, that is, knows both theories.7
7Kuhn also points out that
. . . despite the incompleteness of their communication, proponents of different
theories can exhibit to each other, not always easily, the concrete technical results
achievable by those who practice within each theory. Little or no translation
is required to apply at least some value criteria to those results. (Accuracy
and fruitfulness are most immediately applicable, perhaps followed by scope.
Consistency and simplicity are far more problematic.) (Kuhn, 1977, p. 339,
italics added)
Moreover, for some scientists these considerations may be decisive to change their research
directive:
. . . each language community can usually produce from the start a few con-
crete research results that, though describable in sentences understood in the
same way by both groups, cannot yet be accounted for by the other community
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The following passage gives –at least prima facie– more interpretative leeway
for what ‘translators’ may refer to:
The men who experience such communication breakdowns must,
however, have some recourse. . . . both their everyday and most their
scientific world and language are shared. . . . what the participants in
a communication breakdown can do is recognize each other as mem-
bers of different language communities and then become translators.
(Kuhn, 1962 [1996], p. 201-202, italics added)
Here the talk about ‘becoming translators’ could well be understood in the first
meaning discussed above: i.e., in terms of mastering both languages and being
able to produce equivalent texts. However, this interpretation is barred due to
the impossibility of translating incommensurable theories: after all, incommen-
surability means intranslatability.8
Going-native and conversion Translation is not the only tool Kuhn sug-
gests that is useful for understanding another research paradigm. Indeed, the
process of translation may give rise to a deeper engagement with the other
paradigm, namely to ‘going-native’:
To translate a theory or a worldview into one’s own language is
not to make it one’s own. For that one must go native, discover
that one is thinking and working in, not simply translating out of,
a language that was previously foreign. That transition is not, how-
ever, one that an individual may make or refrain from making by
deliberation and choice, however good his reasons for wishing to do
so. Instead, at some point in the process of learning to translate,
he finds that the transition has occurred, that he has slipped into
the new language without a decision having been made. (Kuhn,
1962 [1996], p. 204, italics added)
Hence, in the process of language acquisition one slips from merely translating
into a more intimate engagement with the new language, that is, one becomes
native, begins to think in the new language and makes it “one’s own”. Of course,
only in this modus are we able to get a deeper understanding of the subtleties of
the new candidate, similarly to the process of learning a foreign tongue. More-
over, the better one’s understanding of the new candidate, the more qualified
and informed will be the judgment concerning its pursuit worthiness.
Now, the question arises whether a scientist could be working in one frame-
work, and yet learn (the language of) the other one to a degree that she is also
in its own terms. If the new viewpoint endures for a time and continues to be
fruitful, the research results verbalizable in this way are likely to grow in number.
For some men such results alone will be decisive. They can say: I don’t know
how the proponents of the new view succeed, but I must learn, whatever they
are doing, it is clearly right. (p. 203, italics added)
Kuhn here suggests that some initial results of a theory can only be described by the scientists
working in a rivaling paradigm, but they cannot be accounted for, explained in their own
terminology. In order for that to be possible, scientists need to learn the new theory.
8“The claim that two theories are incommensurable is then the claim that there is no
language, neutral or otherwise, into which both theories, conceived as sets of sentences, can
be translated without residue or loss.” (Kuhn, 2000, p. 36).
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fluent or “native” in the new candidate? Kuhn’s answer seems to be negative
due to the captivating character of going-native which leads to conversion:
. . . the possibility of translation does not make the term ’conver-
sion’ inappropriate. In the absence of a neutral language, the choice
of a new theory is a decision to adopt a different native language
and to deploy it in a correspondingly different world. That sort of
transition is, however, not one which the terms ’choice’ and ’deci-
sion’ quite fit, though the reasons for wanting to apply them after
the event are clear. Exploring an alternative theory by techniques
like those outlined above, one is likely to find that one is already
using it (as one suddenly notes that one is thinking in, not trans-
lating out of, a foreign language). At no point was one aware of
having reached a decision, made a choice. That sort of change is,
however, conversion, and the techniques which induce it may well
be described as therapeutic, if only because, when they succeed, one
learns one had been sick before. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 277)
Kuhn here tells us that the result of going-native is conversion – a process
in which one not only internalizes the new theory and is “at home in the world
it helps to shape” (Ibid.) but also acquires a commitment of the exclusive type
(C1) resp. (C2) (see Section 3). In this case, a scientist has not only begun
to work in a new theoretical framework, but she has adopted it in a “thera-
peutic” manner, realizing that she previously was “sick”. Hence, conversion
–as explicated in the previous paragraph– also includes the shift of an evalua-
tive perspective, where the new framework becomes the basis of all cognitive
assessments in the given domain.
Therefore, in both of these modes of understanding (i.e. translation and
going-native) the cognitive commitments (C1), (C2) and (C3) are conflated and
confined to one paradigm – to which the rival is being translated, or into which
the scientist has been converted.
Interpretation But what about the possibility that scientists learn a new
theory without necessarily becoming epistemically committed to it resp. with-
out adopting it? In his later work (Kuhn, 2000, pp. 33-57) he characterizes
such a process of learning as interpretation. He contrasts interpretation with
translation (conceived as the skill of a translator, see our discussion above) in
the following way:
[interpretation] is an enterprise practiced by historians and an-
thropologists, among others. Unlike the translator, the interpreter
may initially command only a single language. At the start, the text
on which he or she works consists in whole or in part of unintelligible
noises or inscriptions. . . . If the interpreter succeeds, what he or she
has in the first instance done is learn a new language . . .Whether
that language can be translated into the one with which the inter-
preter began is an open question. Acquiring a new language is not
the same as translating from it into one’s own. Success with the first
does not imply success with the second. (p. 38, italics added)
Translation is, of course, only the first resort of those who seek
comprehension. Communication can be established in its absence.
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But where translation is not feasible, the very different processes of
interpretation and language acquisition are required. (p. 53)
Hence, interpretation is a type of going-native that does not imply conver-
sion, that is, it has no epistemically captivating character. Kuhn, however,
describes interpretation as a tool used by historians of science and anthropol-
ogists, rather than something that is useful for scientists themselves. But why
couldn’t scientists become interpreters as well? This question becomes espe-
cially interesting if we think of the claims of the type C3, which do not require a
full comparative assessment. In contrast to Kuhnian translation, which employs
two languages and is thus more suitable for a comparison of two theories, we
could say that the aim of his notion of interpretation is understanding of one
theory in view of the cognitive horizon of the time. The answer to the above
question seems to lie in Kuhn’s epistemic semantic monism, which we will take
a look at in the following section.
* * *
In the introduction we gave two examples of obstacles that can appear in the
process of rational deliberation concerning questions of pursuit. The first one
concerned the existence of shared standards in the evaluation of theories. The
second obstacle concerned the existence of insurmountable comprehension gaps.
With regard to the former one, we have seen in Section 3 that, when it comes
to persuasion, Kuhn calls upon the existence of shared standards that serve as
the basis of this deliberation process. With regard to the latter, we have seen
in this section that Kuhn offers two tools to overcome these gaps: translation
on the one hand and going-native on the other hand. However, there is a
certain tension that comes along with these tools and rational deliberation.
The problem is that going-native seems to subvert any rational deliberation
due to its non-deliberative character. Deliberation presupposes that we weigh
reasons for and reasons against the given idea and on the basis of this weighing
make a choice or decision. However, the notion of going-native is “not one which
the terms ‘choice’ and ‘decision’ quite fit”. Where language acquisition should
be a tool to gain a better understanding, which should in turn be a tool for
the rational weighing of reasons, for Kuhn the process of language acquisition
makes the rational weighing superfluous since it is itself sufficient to transform
the scientist’s conviction.
We have contrasted going-native with Kuhn’s notion of interpretation. Due
to its lack of an epistemically captivating character interpretation may be more
apt to serve as a tool for rational deliberation.
5 Kuhn’s Epistemic Semantic Monism and the
Question of Pluralism
We have already pointed out a number of places where Kuhn speaks of theory
assessment in the context of theory choice construed either along the lines of
theory acceptance or the choice of a practical directive (rather than an evaluative
stance) with regard to newly developing scientific theories. Already in Section
2 we have seen Kuhn arguing that in debates about which paradigm should
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in future guide the research “a decision between alternate ways of practicing
science is called for”. Moreover, we have seen him offering translation or going-
native (leading to conversion) as tools that scientists can use in debates in the
context of pursuit in order to bridge communication breakdowns.
We were puzzled by two peculiarities: first, Kuhn’s disregard of the possibil-
ity of pursuit worthiness as an evaluative stance that entails no commitments
regarding one’s own research (see Section 3), and second, Kuhn’s insistence on
the epistemically captivating character of a scientist’s going-native which we
contrasted with his notion of interpretation (see Section 4.) In this section we
will root the lack of these options in what we shall call the perspective of epis-
temic semantic monism present in Kuhn’s work. The key idea of this perspective
is that an individual scientist or a group of scientists is epistemically confined
only to one theoretical framework and its taxonomy. On the one hand, it is
an epistemic monism since it refers to the epistemic (or cognitive) perspective
of a scientist (or a group of scientists), which serves as the basis of her (their)
cognitive assessments. On the other hand, it is a semantic monism since it is
essentially rooted in language and its taxonomic structure constituting the given
paradigm as well as the world in which the scientist works (see, e.g., (Kuhn,
2000, p. 52,77)).
Epistemic monism and pursuit worthiness That a certain type of epis-
temic monism is present in Kuhn’s work has been pointed out by others as
well. For instance, Watkins (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970, p. 34) introduced his
“paradigm-monopoly thesis” that “a scientist cannot, while under the sway of
one paradigm, seriously entertain another paradigm”.
Similarly, Hasok Chang (2011) ascribes epistemic monism to Kuhn, pointing
out that the key idea of such a monism is that “if we have the correct theory in
place, all other (genuinely different) theories in that domain must be eliminated”
(p. 426).9 Chang goes on to argue that even Imre Lakatos, who depicts scientific
development in terms of multiple research programmes, motivated this monism
by means of a competition that enables scientists to eventually make the right
choice.
But why are we so obsessed with choice? Why do we need to
choose between different alternatives in a strong, exclusive sense?
Why can’t “choice” be a more relaxed matter of each scientist or
each group of scientists deciding which avenue of investigation to
take, without implying that all the other avenues are inferior and
should be closed off? (Ibid.)
Indeed, Kuhn not only speaks of theory choice as a choice of a cognitive com-
mitment of type (C1) and/or (C2), but he even suggests that the term “choice”
is misleading in this case, since the way a scientist adopts the given framework
is usually not even voluntary (see also (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, p. 257-258)).
Darrell Rowbottom (2011) points out that according to Kuhn, work within
a paradigm as a disciplinary matrix is possible only if that paradigm is taken
for granted (p. 118):
9However, this is not the whole truth since there is also a pluralist side to Kuhn as we
discuss below.
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Kuhn appears to have thought that scientists would not be mo-
tivated to tackle such esoteric problems (or puzzles) without rigid
belief – or even faith – in the paradigm.
This claim may also be somewhat dubious, however, because
it is possible to do things for extrinsic reasons. I could learn to
recite a poem in order to impress a prospective lover without having
any interest in verse or metre, just as a scientist could be content
to solve puzzles, in the short term, in order to support himself and
slowly build a reputation which would lead to some of his potentially
revolutionary ideas being taken more seriously by his peers. (p. 119,
italics added)
Rowbottom points out that there may be good reasons for a scientist to work on
a theory (see (C2)) while not being epistemically committed to it in a stronger
sense (see (C1)). Even though we can agree with Rowbottom that engaging in
puzzle solving may be independent from the adoption of the given disciplinary
matrix, it is important to notice that extrinsic reasons are not necessarily re-
quired for such an engagement. A scientist may simply conclude that making
any stronger epistemic claims (such as an overall acceptance, or a belief resp.
faith in its truthfulness, or the claim that it is the best resp. preferred among the
given alternatives, etc.) about the given theory would be unwarranted since pre-
mature, but this need not prevent her to evaluate it as worthy of pursuit (either
in terms of a research directive or in terms of an evaluative stance). Moreover,
scientists may have intrinsic epistemic resp. cognitive reasons for making claims
of pursuit worthiness as evaluative stances, which do not presuppose their full
epistemic or practical commitment to the framework in question. These may be
various prospective values that indicate that a theory is promising to be further
investigated. For instance, if one evaluates the predictive power of the theory
in question or its inferential connections with theories from other domains, she
may conclude that this candidate is promising to be further researched, even
though she may not have any practical commitments regarding it (that is, she
may assess it as worthy of pursuit without making a decision to engage in its
pursuit).
Epistemic monism and methodological pluralism However, this discus-
sion does not imply that Kuhn disregards the value of pluralism in scientific
theory and practice. In contrary, he has emphasized more than once that due
to the necessary uncertainty regarding the future of scientific theories, it is of
vital importance for the progress of science that more than one research path
remains explored. In other words, Kuhn’s position is a monist one regarding the
cognitive commitments of an individual scientist (resp. of groups of scientists
working within the same paradigm), while he is a methodological pluralist in
the sense that he finds the plurality of pursued paths fruitful for the scientific
enterprise.
Nevertheless, the presence of the former makes his pluralism restricted. More
precisely, by disregarding scientists’ claims of pursuit worthiness as evaluative
stances, Kuhn limits pluralism to a disagreement among scientists:
Before the group accepts it, a new theory has been tested over
time by the research of a number of men, some working within it,
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others within its traditional rival. Such a mode of development,
however, requires a decision process which permits rational men to
disagree, and such disagreement would be barred by the shared algo-
rithm which philosophers generally have sought. If it were at hand,
all conforming scientists would make the same decision at the same
time.. . .With standards of acceptance set too low, they would move
from one attractive global viewpoint to another, never giving tradi-
tional theory an opportunity to supply equivalent attractions. With
standards set higher, no one satisfying the criterion of rationality
would be inclined to try out the new theory, to articulate it in ways
which showed its fruitfulness or displayed its accuracy and scope. I
doubt that science would survive the change. (Kuhn, 1977, p. 332,
italics added)
The talk about ‘trying theories’ and ‘moving to attractive viewpoints’ sug-
gests that the assessment of pursuit worthiness here comes as a practical di-
rective regarding a concrete research path of an individual scientist. Different
scientists may find different theories more worthy of pursuit than others, and
hence each of them may decide to engage in the pursuit of a different one. In
order to assure such a diversity of pursued theories, Kuhn argues that a dis-
agreement among scientists in their evaluation of pursuit worthiness of the given
theories is necessary.10
The fact that the pursuit of different paths by scientists leads to scientific
pluralism is trivial. However, what deserves some more discussion is the claim
that a disagreement among scientists is essential to pluralism. First of all,
it is not clear where the disagreement really lies in case the subject matter
concerns the pursuit worthiness of theories as research directives. There is no
disagreement in X’s conclusion “I should pursue theory T1” and Y’s conclusion
“I should pursue theory T2”. Rather, a disagreement would only concern a
more general claim concerning the pursuit worthiness of some theory that is not
relativized to one’s own research activity. But that concerns claims of pursuit
worthiness as evaluative stances.
However, making a claim of pursuit worthiness as an evaluative stance does
not require a “shared algorithm” which delivers as an output a unique theory
that is worthy of pursuit. In contrary, both (some) new candidates as well as the
traditional rival could simultaneously be assessed as worthy of pursuit. Scien-
tists may still have different preferences concerning the question which theories
they find most worthy to work on. This way a discipline may be characterized
by a plurality of pursued theories without any disagreement being necessary for
it. Hence, Kuhn’s dilemma from the previous quote can be avoided. Of course,
there may still be disagreement about the pursuit worthiness of some candidates.
However, this disagreement seems not anymore essential to pluralism.
Therefore, in addition to a pluralism emerging from such a dissent, there
is also a pluralism that can emerge out of an agreement regarding the claims
of pursuit worthiness as evaluative stances. An individual scientist in this case
evaluates a theory as worthy of pursuit without necessarily engaging in its actual
pursuit. She can say: “Even though I prefer to explore theory T1, theory T2 is
worthy of pursuit as well, and it is rational for another scientist to pursue it.”.
10Also, in Hoyningen-Huene’s reading of Kuhn, such a disagreement is considered as vital
for the development of science (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006, p. 128).
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Nevertheless, in order for such a pluralism to be possible, epistemic semantic
monism has to be removed. Without its burden, Kuhnian tools –persuasion,
translation and interpretation– can receive a role in the rational deliberation
regarding the claims of pursuit worthiness as evaluative stances.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented Kuhn’s stance on the question of pursuit wor-
thiness as well as the actuality of some of his points for the contemporary dis-
cussions on this issue. On the one hand, we have shown that Kuhn explicates
tools that may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when
engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether
a theory is worthy of further pursuit. More precisely, even when confronted with
an incommensurable paradigm, scientists can resort to the tools of persuasion,
translation, and interpretation in order to learn the new theory and to thus be
able to assess its pursuit worthiness. On the other hand, we have shown that if
these tools are to be fully apt for this task, the assumption of epistemic semantic
monism present in Kuhn’s work has to be abandoned. That way, persuasion
becomes the process in which scientists aim at convincing each other to change
their views regarding their respective evaluative stances of pursuit worthiness,
while interpretation becomes suitable not only for historians of science, but also
for scientists themselves. Furthermore, such an approach gives rise to a plu-
ralism of scientific theories and practices that complements Kuhn’s pluralism,
based on dissensus among scientists as its conditio sine qua non.
It is interesting to notice that a Kuhnian conception of pluralism comes
with a peculiar asymmetry: the one between, on the one hand, the method-
ologist/philosopher of science who upholds the merits of having a plurality of
scientific accounts, and, on the other hand, the scientist who, being an epistemic
monist, tries to convince other scientists of her account being the most valuable
option to choose. Since the scientists cannot agree on the one most valuable
option they split into different camps and pluralism is the outcome. The plural-
ist’s golden apple, its very vital principle is dissensus. Thrown into the scientific
community it causes it to flourish healthy, just like Erin’s apple in the Greek
myth causes the goddesses to compete and show themselves from their best
sides while awaiting Paris’ ultimate choice of the best one. And here we are
reminded of the epistemic monist’s focus on theory choice discussed earlier.
In this paper we have sketched an alternative type of pluralism where the
asymmetry between the pluralist methodologist and the monist scientist disap-
pears. In this alternative view scientists are allowed to be pluralists as well. We
have argued that as soon as scientists evaluate theories in terms of their pursuit
worthiness instead of in terms of theory acceptance and instead of in terms of
individual research directives, they may as well judge a plurality of theories as
worthy of pursuit. This allows for a more harmonious view on science where the
division between the methodologist’s pluralist topdown view and the scientist’s
monist view is unnecessary. It allows for and values pluralism by giving back
to each individual scientist the vivid curiosity that fuels her imagination, where
she may say for not just one, but for many ideas: “This is interesting, somebody
should pursue it further . . . ”.
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